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COMPELLING COLLABORATION WITH EVIL?
A COMMENT ON CROSBY v. NATIONAL
FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL
Sanford Levinson*
Our topic on this panel is "Constitutional Interpretation and
Aspirations to a Good Society." Clearly one must begin with some
notion of what might be considered a "good society," worthy of
aspiring to, and then move on to the role that the Constitution,
properly interpreted, might play with regard to achieving (or
hindering) those aspirations. Let me offer one possible definition of a
"good society": Such a society would be one that minimizes its own
engagement in, or even collaboration with, evil. The extent to which a
state colludes with evil thus defines how much less "good" it might
otherwise be. And "evil" means, of course, something other than not
being the very best we can be. We are not required, as individuals or
societies, to be saints, but it is a small enough requirement of both that
we not sink to the depths of whatever we mean by non-goodness. As
Judith Shklar argues, the first virtue of a liberal society is to try to
minimize cruelty.1 One should note, even if only in passing, that this
concept of a "good society" clearly rejects a purely procedural notion
of social order, by which any outcome is acceptable if it is the result of
a fair process of decision-making.2 There is nothing "neutral" about
preferring goodness to evil.
The problem of collaborating with evil is inherent to the narrative
of American constitutional law, given the paramount presence of
chattel slavery within the constitutional order prior to the passage of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Could anyone have described the
United States, including its constituent member-states, as a "good
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School. I am especially grateful to Sarah Cleveland for her
help, as well as to my fellow participants in a faculty colloquium at the University of
Texas Law School on Crosby, who included, in addition to Cleveland, Lynn Baker,
Patricia Hansen, Louise Weinberg, and Ernest Young.
1. See Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices 7-44 (1984).
2. Given the brevity of these comments, I put to one side the possibility of
describing a set of "purely procedural" restraints that does not smuggle into the idea
of "fair process" a set of substantive notions as to what respect human agency
requires.
3. This is not to say that slavery truly disappeared with the formal abolition of
"involuntary servitude" in 1865.
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society" during this period? While the "slave states" directly
legitimized the ownership of some human beings by others, the "free
states" collaborated with the evil, by, among other things, acquiescing
in the return of ostensible "fugitive slaves" to the states where they
had purportedly been held in bondage. In this article, I am most
interested in the latter states, as I assume there is no serious argument
about the wickedness of the former. But what of those purported free
states, whose predicament we can perhaps understand far better than
that faced by states directly committed to slavery? Specifically, what
restrictions did the Constitution place on those states that wished to
eliminate or minimize their collaboration with slavery?
Prigg v. Pennsylvania4 is, of course, the key case on such limits.
There, the ostensibly anti-slavery Justice Story, who moonlighted as a
professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School, wrote for the
Court in striking down Pennsylvania's so-called "liberty law," which
required slave-owners to persuade local courts that those people they
viewed as "their" fugitive slaves were in fact so. This meant, among
other things, that Pennsylvania had no right to invoke its law against
the slave-catcher Prigg, who had kidnapped Elizabeth Morgan in
patent violation of the liberty law. Instead, said the Court, the
Constitution itself licensed what we might today call "self-help
repossession" of alleged fugitives by their masters.5 Story defended
the Court's continued commitment to the ultimate evil of slavery as
necessary for the overall goodness of the Union, and therefore, as a
mandate to preserve the Union at all costs.6
Perhaps we agree with Story that pandering to the interests of
slaveowners is preferable to acting in ways that would increase the
likelihood of disunion and, possibly, war. If so, this suggests a possible
distinction between the genuinely "good society," which the United
States most definitely was not, and what might be termed the "good
enough" society, that is, one that contains great evil but that is
nonetheless deserving of the support of decent people, and
concomitantly, justifies the rejection of views like those of William
Lloyd Garrison, who counseled "No Union [and thus no
collaboration] With Slaveholders."7  Reasonable people who are
presumably good differ, however, on how much evil can be present in
a society before being "good enough" collapses of its own weight.
It is now time to jump forward from 1842, when Prigg was decided,
to the new millennium. In particular I will, in these brief remarks,.
4. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
5. Id. at 639-40.
6. Id. at 623-26.
7. 3 The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison 118 (Walter M. Merrill & Louis
Ruchames eds., 1971).
8. My formal role on the panel was to comment on Michael Dorf's very
interesting paper. See Michael Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist
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play with modem-day notions of a "good society" within the context
of a case decided this past June by the United States Supreme Court.
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,9 the Court
unanimously10 invalidated a Massachusetts act barring state entities
from purchasing goods or services from companies doing business in
Burma (now Myanmar), 11 on the grounds that it was pre-empted by
congressional legislation. 2 There are, I submit, certain similarities
between Prigg and Crosby that should be taken into account in any
discussion of the propriety of the latter.
Generating the Massachusetts Act was, presumably, a repulsion by
the people of Massachusetts, as represented by the legislature, at the
prospect of collaborating even indirectly with the notably tyrannical
regime that currently controls Burma. 3 To be sure, the Supreme
Court does not give the specific history of the Massachusetts Act, but
it does quote from the somewhat comparable federal act that imposes
similar, though not identical, sanctions on Burma. 4 Thus Congress
Court, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2161 (2001). To a significant extent, this article is more
"freestanding," certainly influenced in some respects by the themes that Dorf
elaborated, but not truly a comment on the entirety of his paper.
9. 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
10. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred only in the judgment, for
reasons that need not concern this article.
11. There are certain exceptions and exemptions that need not be discussed. See
An Act Regulating State Contracts With Companies Doing Business With or in
Burma (Myanmar), Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (Lexis 1998).
12- See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2291 (citing Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110
Stat. 3009-166, 3009-167 (1997)).
13. One might, of course, regard this sentence as extremely naive. After all, I
have no evidence for the proposition that "the people of Massachusetts," even if we
were confident we could identify such an entity, spoke with a strong voice demanding
such action. More likely, the legislation was elicited by well-placed groups, probably
linked with the "human rights" community, who pointed out that Massachusetts could
align itself with progressive political forces at a relatively small cost to the state. To
this extent, I am adopting a highly informal social choice explanation. What I doubt,
though, is that the legislation can be explained as more economistic -rent-seeking"
behavior in which local economic interests, in order to line their own pockets, attempt
to enlist the coercive power of the state to deny access to local markets of potentially
more efficient competitors. This assumption may have constitutional overtones,
inasmuch as the strongest argument for intervening against state economic regulation
is a well-merited suspicion that the regulation in question is an attempt to help out
local economic interest by freezing out out-of-state competition. "[When a state
statute clearly discriminates against interstate commerce, it will be struck down,
unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to
economic protectionism." Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 1031
(2000) (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)). See generally
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (1986) (describing the
Dormant Commerce Clause as a tool used to prevent states from -engaging in
purposeful economic protectionism.").
14. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2291-92 (citing § 570 of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997).
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noted that the Burmese government had committed "large-scale
repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition,"' 5 the
most notable member of which is the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. Indeed, President Clinton, acting under
authorization of the congressional statute, found that the Burmese
regime had "committed large-scale repression of the democratic
opposition in Burma" as a predicate condition for an Executive Order
imposing certain sanctions on the regime. 16
One might see the two pieces of legislation as exemplifying the
ability of two of the foundational governmental structures within the
United States17 to forge concurrent policies responding to the same
perception of an evil existing in the world that we should, to whatever
extent possible, have nothing to do with and indeed, work to bring
down. No serious argument was made that the Massachusetts
legislation as a whole was in direct conflict with the federal legislation,
which would, of course, present the problem that the Supremacy
Clause was designed to resolve. 8 But one would be wrong to predict
peaceful constitutional co-existence. Instead, the Clinton
Administration supported the private litigant, the National Foreign
Trade Council, described as "a nonprofit corporation representing
companies engaged in foreign commerce," thirty-four of whom were
on Massachusetts' "restricted purchase list" and thus ineligible for
unimpeded access to the market for state-purchased goods and
services. 9 The Solicitor General of the United States, therefore,
strongly urged the affirmance by the Supreme Court of the circuit
court's decision below striking down the Massachusetts law as being
beyond the state's powers. And the Court agreed.20
Although the initial arguments presented before the federal district
court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals both emphasized the
Dormant Commerce Clause and a so-called Dormant Foreign Policy
Clause,2' the Supreme Court sidestepped these constitutional issues by
15. Id. at 2292 (citing § 570(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997).
16. Id. (discussing Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997)).
17. The third is Indian tribes.
18. U. S. Const. art. VI. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 767, 770-73, 814 (1994) (proposing that the Supremacy Clause and the
pre-emption power are two distinctly different legal concepts, with the Supremacy
Clause acting not to abolish concurrent state power, but rather, to be asserted only
when existing state law conflicts with congressional action). Justice Souter did
suggest, however, that the Massachusetts law "conflicts with federal law at a number
of points by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted
or excluded from sanctions." See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2297. The case is not, however,
an "as applied" challenge to Massachusetts' attempt to apply any given provision
involving such "explicit" exemptions or exclusions, but is rather, in effect, a "facial"
challenge to the legislation. See generally id. at 2302-04 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2293.
20. Id. at 2294.
21. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999);
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instead treating the case as one involving congressional pre-emption
that displaced any state regulation, whether or not it was actually in
conflict with the federal legislation. Still, the kinds of constitutional
concerns that those other arguments evoke appear to hover in the
background, including the ability of states to act against evils in ways
that might run counter to certain conceptions of national interests (as
against the interest of a particular state).
Justice Souter, for the majority, holds that the Massachusetts law is
"an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives
under the federal Act."'  One might have thought that if in fact
Congress believed this to be the case, there would be at least a
scintilla of evidence in the record that Congress indeed perceived the
state law as such "an obstacle," given that the federal Act was passed
a full three months after the enactment of the Massachusetts law?
Indeed, what triggered Justice Scalia's typically sarcastic concurring
opinion was precisely the fact that Souter paid so much attention to
legislative history,24 so that one might especially expect Souter to have
uncovered any such evidence if it existed. The most he was able to
muster, however, was to hypothesize that it was "unlikely that
Congress intended both to enable the President to protect national
security by giving him the flexibility to suspend or terminate federal
sanctions and simultaneously to allow Massachusetts to act at odds
with the President's judgment of what national security requires. '"
A few things are worth noting about this sentence, beginning with
the fact that Souter is obviously inferring from the statute a limitation
on Massachusetts' power that he admits is explicitly stated nowhere in
the statute. 6 This might normally be expected to generate some
questions, if not outright opposition, from those members of the
Court who in recent years have sought to revive a vigorous notion of
state autonomy and concomitant protection from federal legislation.'
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289, 293 (D. Mass. 1998).
22. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294.
23. See id. at 2291.
24. See id& at 2302-04 passirn.
Of course even if all of the Court's invocations of legislative history were not
utterly irrelevant, I would still object to them, since neither the statements of
individual Members of Congress (ordinarily addressed to a virtually empty
floor), nor Executive statements and letters addressed to congressional
committees, nor the nonenactment of other proposed legislation, is a reliable
indication of what a majority of both Houses of Congress intended when
they voted for the statute before us.
Id- at 2303 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
25. Id. at 2296 n.10.
26. See id. at 2293.
27. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (holding
unconstitutional the "commandeering" of state officials to aid in the implementation
of federal legislation); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174, 175 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional the direction by the United States that states "take title" to
otherwise undisposed-of radioactive waste); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470
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As noted though, there is no dissent, which suggests the importance of
a second aspect of Justice Souter's sentence, which is its emphasis on
"national security."'  Indeed, the entire opinion is suffused with a
language appropriate to the rise of the Leviathan State that occurred
in the aftermath of World War II and the onset of the Cold War.
President Clinton's own declaration regarding the existence of
repression in Burma, for example, is followed by the finding that the
actions of the Burmese regime constitute "an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States,' 29 a situation, says the Court, "characterized as a
national emergency."30
No rational person could possibly believe this. The willingness of
the Court to accept this boilerplate hysteria, and to use it as the
underlying basis for limiting the power of Massachusetts to cordon
itself off from collaboration with this evil regime, bespeaks a view of
national power that is absolutely astonishing. A case like Crosby
directly contradicts Professor Doff's suggestion that the current
majority of the Court is in the grip of a Jeffersonian obsession with
local autonomy." There are, to be sure, certain cases that might
support such a view, 32 but Crosby is most certainly not one of them.
Consider, for example, the full impact of the Court's citation to
Hamilton's Federalist No. 80: "[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not
to be left at the disposal of a PART. The union will undoubtedly be
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. 33
(1991) (imposing "plain statement" rule on Congress with regard to imposition of
Age Discrimination in Employment Act on state governments); see also Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (holding Congress' imposition on states of a
duty not to discriminate on grounds of age to be beyond congressional power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2296 n.10.
29. Id. at 2292 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997)). My
colleague, Sarah Cleveland, informs me that this language comes from the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706
(1991 & Supp. 2000), which authorizes the President to impose a range of sanctions
based on a finding that an international emergency indeed exists that threatens the
national security or foreign relations of the United States.
30. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2292.
31. Dorf, supra note 8, at 2177-86. One might also get this impression from recent
sovereign immunity cases, which have, to put it mildly, seen the Court engage in
Herculean efforts to prevent "sovereign" states from suffering the indignity of being
sued merely because they are violating certain rights established by federal law. See
generally Ernest A. Young, Foreward: State Supreme Sovereign Immunity and the
Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 1-2 (proposing that the current Court has
made a formidable effort to enforce the doctrine of state sovereign immunity). As
Professor Young well argues, however, this almost fanatical commitment to state
autonomy is belied by the Court's general (and continuing) response in pre-emption
cases, where the states have consistently lost out to expansive interpretation of
purported congressional intent. See id. at 39-42. Crosby, of course, well exemplifies
this latter aspect of the Court's approach.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2299 n.16 (quoting The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander
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Therefore, one should not expect, or want, states to play any role at
all when "peace" with "foreign powers" is at issue.
The Court notes that the federal act authorizes the President to act
"in the interest of national security"' not only to impose sanctions,
but just as importantly, to lift them. And "it is just this plenitude of
Executive authority that we think controls the issue of pre-
emption .... ,,3" The Massachusetts law is characterized as
"unyielding, '36 as opposed to the flexibility placed by Congress in the
hands of a President with full discretion, apparently, to impose or
suspend sanctions based only on his or her reading of what American
national security requires. The model of international politics
suggested by the Court is one in which the President must have
maximum freedom to bargain with other countries, and "[q]uite
simply, if the Massachusetts law is enforceable the President has less
to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage as a
consequence .... [H]ere, the state Act reduces the value of the
[bargaining] chips created by the federal statute. '7
Note well the practical implications of this model. It is clear that
Massachusetts therefore may never effectively impose a lesser degree
of sanction on Burma than that imposed by the national government.
If the President is unable to strike a bargain with a foreign country
and therefore continues sanctions, no state could plausibly claim a
unilateral right to lift them. It is less clear, however, whether a state
might have the freedom to act on its belief that the national
government is not vigorous enough in its opposition to evil. With
regard to slavery, the practical question was not whether a non-slave
state could be especially cooperative with a slave one, but, rather,
whether it could be uncooperative in any way in returning fugitive
slaves. Similarly, in Crosby the question is whether Massachusetts has
the power to place any obstacles at all in the way of the Burmese
regime and its business collaborators beyond those endorsed by the
President at any given moment.
The Court invokes the "capacity of the President to speak for the
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments,"' and it
suggests that this capacity is "compromise[d]" by the Massachusetts
law.39 To put it mildly, this "one voice" notion of foreign affairs is
subject to challenge, both descriptive and normative. Consider first
the reality of American political practices, some of which are derived
Hamilton)).
34. Id. at 2295.
35. Id. The Court also refers to "the fullness of [the President's] authority," which
presumably disallows any sharing at all with the authority of a state. Id at 2296.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2298.
39. Id.
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from basic constitutional norms. A President negotiates and signs a
treaty. Does that mean that he or she has "sp[oken] for the
Nation?"40 The answer, of course, is no. The Constitution itself
requires that treaties be submitted to the Senate for ratification, and it
is a notorious truth that one-third, plus one of the Senate can torpedo
a President's most insistent vision of what the national interest
requires. If one needs an example, begin with the Senate's rejection
of the Treaty of Versailles; if that is too far in the past, consider the
unwillingness of the Senate to ratify a treaty against genocide signed
in 1948 by President Truman.
I hope that a personal anecdote is illuminating on this point. In
1987 I had the honor and pleasure of traveling to China to participate
in a week-long seminar with Chinese scholars on American
constitutional history. During the week that I was in Beijing, I was
asked by a Chinese participant about the recent passage by Congress
of a resolution condemning the Chinese repression in Tibet, which
was accompanied by a statement by the spokesperson for the United
States Department of State that what happened in Tibet was an
internal matter for the People's Republic of China.4' Which of these
positions, I was asked, represented the position of the United States
Government? My answer, made entirely seriously, was that my
interlocutor did not understand that the United States does not have
"a government" in the sense that one often uses that term, as in "Her
Majesty's Government." That is, the question assumed that there was
indeed a singular entity called "the Government of the United States"
that spoke with one authoritative voice, so that only one of the
conflicting approaches to the Chinese role in Tibet could express "the
Government's" position. But such a singular government does not
exist. That, of course, is the central meaning of the system of
separated and divided powers which, for better and worse,
characterizes the American system of government(s). What one has,
almost endlessly, is competing centers of political power claiming the
authority to speak for the "We the People" for whom politicians are
ostensibly the mere agents. Only when a certain degree of
institutional coordination is achieved, as when Congress passes a law
signed by the President, might one begin to say that "the
Government" has spoken, although even that statement might be
tempered by reference either to the role of the judiciary or to that of
the states, whose approval might also be needed under some
circumstances, to provide the "one voice."
40. Id.
41. See Human Rights Violations in Tibet, H.R. 2476, 100th Cong., 133 Cong.
Rec. 13032 (1987); see also Elaine Sciolino, Beijing is Backed by Administration on
Unrest in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at Al (describing the divergent positions
taken by the Reagan Administration and Congress on the Chinese takeover of Tibet).
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A standard normative defense of the baroque processes of
American governance is that presented in Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Myers v. United States?2 and quoted by Justice Douglas in his
concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,43 which sharply rejected the
power of President Truman to do whatever he thought necessary to
prosecute the Korean War:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
the governmental powers among three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.'
Of course, Brandeis here was talking about so-called "horizontal
separation of powers" at the national level of government, thus the
reference to "three departments." But, obviously, there is a "vertical"
dimension of separated powers within our system, even if limning the
degree of constitutionally-protected separation is the single most
enduring problem of our constitutional order. In any event, one can
easily conceptualize the system of separated powers as one that
protects the presence of multiple voices and places significant
difficulties in the path of any one particular person or entity claiming
the right to speak on behalf of "We the People."45
One need not argue that Massachusetts has a constitutionally
protected right to carry out a full-scale foreign policy. The
Constitution itself prohibits any state, without congressional consent,
from "enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with ... a foreign
Power, or engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."46 And, of course, I
readily concede that Congress can prevent Massachusetts from
engaging in all sorts of activity that might otherwise be
constitutionally permissible in the absence of an invocation of national
supremacy. It might indeed be necessary for the United States to
climb into bed with extraordinarily unattractive and ruthless regimes
and to guarantee them protection against hurdles posed by state
legislation. No country that allied itself with Joseph Stalin in order to
defeat Adolf Hitler can be unaware of the grim necessities of "lesser
evilism."
42. 272 U.S. 52,240-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952).
44. Id.
45. I mimic Bruce Ackerman's argument here, insofar as he both takes the notion
of popular sovereignty exceedingly seriously and notes the various hurdles that must
be surmounted before anyone can claim the mantle of such sovereignty. See Bruce
Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in Responding to Imperfection 63 (Sanford Levinson
ed., 1995).
46. U. S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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What is at issue is the degree of congressional specificity that is
required in order to deprive states of what might otherwise be seen as
important powers. As with all separation of powers arguments, the
ultimate question is not whether a state or an individual can be
deprived of certain otherwise protected liberties, but, rather, what
particular institutions must be mobilized in order to make such
deprivations legitimate.47
Once one realizes the empirical fatuity of the Court's assertion of
the "one voice" image of presidential authority to conduct foreign
affairs, then one can well ask why states cannot have their own role to
play in encouraging the kind of civic deliberation that is at the heart of
the Brandeisian vision of an aroused citizenry constantly asking itself
the deepest questions about what is being done in its name.48 And
what issue could possibly be more fit for public deliberation than the
degree of collaboration with evil regimes that it is appropriate-one
might even suggest "necessary and proper"- to engage in? This is,
after all, the most fundamental issue of international politics, where
one is constantly being asked to cooperate with-or some would say
"appease"-regimes that are founded on values repugnant to those
we fancy ourselves guided by. To be sure, the answers to such
questions-not to mention the identification of repugnant regimes in
the first place-are politically controversial. Consider only the
competing arguments that might be made with regard to American
policy vis-a-vis Cuba and China, one the victim of almost insanely
stringent sanctions, the other welcomed by the United States into full
participation in the international community.
Perhaps the most truly pathetic section of Justice Souter's opinion
comes toward the end, when he attempts to address Massachusetts'
point that a number of sub-national political communities passed
measures imposing one variety or another of sanctions against the
South African apartheid regime.49 He does not mention that these
were passed in the teeth of the Reagan Administration's position at
the time that "constructive engagement," and not sanctions,
constituted proper policy, as it resisted congressional efforts to pass
national sanctions legislation."0 In any event, such local sanctions, he
47. See, for example, the debate about Abraham Lincoln's unilateral suspension
of habeas corpus during the opening days of the Civil War. The Constitution itself
obviously contemplates such suspension, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, but the question
presented was whether it required prior congressional consent before the suspension
could take place or whether Lincoln possessed certain "inherent" powers to do so
even in the absence of such consent. Chief Justice Taney, among others, thought that
Lincoln possessed no such powers. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md.
1861) (No. 9487).
48. See, for example, his classic concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 372-80 (1927).
49. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2301-02 (2000).
50. See Andrea L. McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-
Apartheid Measures: Infiusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62
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notes, were upheld both by courts5 and, perhaps equally significantly,
by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. - The
Court is reduced to saying that "we never ruled on whether state and
local sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were pre-empted or
otherwise invalid,' ' 3 which, among other things, appears to suggest the
possibility that one of the most important (and morally defensible)
political movements towards a "good society" in the 1980s might have
been unconstitutional in the eyes of the Court, and that states and
cities might have been forced to collaborate with the evils of apartheid
even in the absence of a clear declaration by Congress to that end.
One might point to a special irony of Crosby, which was decided
only nine days before Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.' There a
sharply divided court upheld the right of the Boy Scouts to exclude
homosexuals from participation in their programs, as against the right
of New Jersey to subject the Scouts to the state's public
accommodations law prohibiting such discrimination. According to
the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "Dale's presence in
the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send
a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."55 That is, the Scouts have a protected expressive interest
that is protected against state regulation. Without taking sides as to
whether Dale itself was correctly decided, I simply note the
unwillingness of the Court to recognize a similar interest of the
citizens of Massachusetts in wishing "to send a message ... [to] the
world,"56 that the behavior of the Burmese regime is abhorrent to
them.
Perhaps it is a category mistake to analogize private organizations
to the State; one might, after all, say that the State, at least in its
liberal version, must be relentlessly neutral with regard to how
anyone, either at home or abroad, should live their lives. At the very
least, however, such a view of state neutrality requires extended
Temp. L. Rev. 813, 814-15 (1989) (analyzing American sub-national governmental
units' protests against South African apartheid through sanctions during the Reagan
era); Jeff Walker, Economic Sanctions: United States Sanctions Against South Africa
-Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(1986), 28 Harv. Int'l L.J. 117 (1987) (reviewing the congressional response to the
Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement toward apartheid).
51. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301-02 n.25 (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744-49 (Md. 1989) (holding that the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986 does not pre-empt Baltimore's divestment ordinance)).
52. Id (citing Constitutionality of South African Divestment Statutes Enacted by
State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49, 64-66, 1986 WL 213238)
("state and local ... laws [are] not pre-empted by pre-CAAA federal law").
53. Id at 2302.
54. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
55. Id. at 2454 (emphasis added).
56. Id
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argument, and I think it is fair to say that most theorists find such a
notion of antiseptic neutrality objectionable, if not outright
incoherent. We are, after all, a country founded on the proposition
that the point of our national enterprise is to "establish Justice"57 and
if one takes this seriously, then one can understand neither the United
States as a nation nor individual states within a frame of strict
neutrality. Moreover, as an empirical matter, governments are always
trying to form a public consciousness as to what is proper or
admirable behavior and, concomitantly, what is objectionable
behavior.58 A state university could surely present Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi with an honorary degree praising her for her brave battle
against Burmese repression; it could also choose to name a public
square after her, with a statue designed to inform the public about her
valor. The next step, obviously, is for the state to declare that it does
not wish to help subsidize the regime by entering into contracts with
businesses that serve, as a practical matter, to bolster its power. Yet
this ostensibly conservative Court takes no cognizance at all of
Massachusetts' own expressive interests and seems absolutely
indifferent to protecting them, at least until Congress clearly indicates
that American national interests require speaking in far more muted
tones than Massachusetts would prefer.
It would surely be hyperbolic to place Crosby in the same moral
universe as Prigg, one of the most truly despicable decisions in the
history of the United States Supreme Court.59 That being conceded,
one should not be blind to a genuine similarity between them, namely,
the stunning dismissal by the Court of a state's interest in minimizing
its own participation, however indirect, in political regimes that
tyrannically deprive their own populace of what we are increasingly
inclined to describe as basic human rights. There is no eloquence, or
inspiration, in Crosby. There is only a Court mouthing Cold War
platitudes at a time when they make increasingly little sense. Whether
one is to the conventional "left" or "right," one might still be
concerned about the Court's complacent displacement of state
authority in the name of a non-existent one-voice nationalism. And
one might ask whether it represents an exercise in constitutional
interpretation that fully recognizes what it might mean to aspire to a
good society.
57. U. S. Const. pmbl.
58. See Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing
Societies (1998) (describing the efforts of government entities to influence public
opinion through public monuments).
59. Although I leave open the possibility that it is in fact the Constitution, and not
merely Prigg, that is despicable.
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